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Introduction 
Terrorists are typically viewed as romantic idealists or mindless 
predators. Rationality based approaches to terrorist behavior have cor-
respondingly not been attempted. Terrorist movements vary greatly in com-
position, objectives and strategy. Yet terrorism, like more conventional 
warfare, can be understood as politics pursued by other means. According-
ly, political economic models of international conflict can be applied to the 
strategies of terrorist alliances, albeit with diminished empirical utility ow-
ing to the shadowy character and small numbers of their quarry. 
Since Mancur Olson's pioneering work in the mid 1960's, the economic 
theory of collective (or "public") goods has been used with varying success 
to describe all sorts of political activity and inactivity. Olson and others 
have often treated the international security provided by peacetime alliances 
as a collective good. Yet these scholars have not applied their frameworks to 
the fighting conducted when alliances are actually employed in wartime; nor 
have they considered the special problems nonstate alliances have in collec-
tively waging their conflicts. This paper will briefly outline the collective 
goods paradigm and its previous employment in studies of defense policy. 
Further, we will suggest how these concepts could describe terrorist 
movements. 
Collective Goods 
In his seminal The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson develops 
the collective goods approach previously suggested by Head, Musgrave, 
Samuelson, and other economists. Olson applies the concept to such 
behavior as political lobbying, the formation of labor unions, international 
alliance behavior, and even the revolution of the proletariat.' 
Purely collective (or public) goods can be distinguished from private 
goods by their nonexclusivity and nonrivalness. Private goods are exclusive 
and rival since the consumer of a particular good can exclude others from 
its consumption and since his or her consumption leaves a smaller quantity 
of the good to be consumed by others. For example, a consumer's purchase 
of a Cabbage Patch Doll, given a (perhaps artificially) limited supply of the 
good, leaves one less doll to be enjoyed by others. The consumer, moreover, 
can and probably will exclude others from using his or her doll. National 
defense, in contrast, is consumed equally by all within a polity (though not 
all may desire the same amount of defense) and none can be deprived of its 
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benefits. The supply is similarly nonrival since the addition of an individual 
to the polity and his or her consumption of its defense does not leave less of 
the good to be enjoyed by others. 
Since none can be excluded, all within a polity will benefit from the 
provision of a collective good whether or not they contribute their share to 
cost of the good. In a large community, moreover, an individual's contribu-
tion to the provisiort of a collective good will have no recognizable impact 
on its supply and hence provide little strictly utilitarian incentive for the in-
dividual to contribute. This is not to say that nonrnaterial, or in economic 
parlance, "nonrational" incentives are not important. 2 Still, in these large 
or "latent" groups, many will free ride, enjoying the benefits of the collec-
tive good without paying their fair share for it. Olson therefore argues that 
collective goods provided by and for large communities will normally be 
provided in a severely suboptimal quantity (and may not be provided at all) 
unless individuals are coerced to contribute or given selective incentives only 
available to those who do contribute. 3 Mandatory taxation is an example of 
the former. The magazines, special insurance policies, trips, and other selec-
tive incentives offered to members of unions and various lobbying organiza-
tions are examples of the latter. Apparently, few farmers, factory workers, 
or others will join organizations which could yield their groups great 
benefits unless they are coaxed by selective incentives or intimidated in 
various ways some not unlike terrorism. 
This simple understanding leads to interesting propositions about actor 
size and organization formation. Most important, large actors may have 
sufficient incentive. to provide a collective good benefiting many others 
simply because they have so much at stake and since their resources are suf-
ficient to provide all or most of the cost of the good. For example, Olson 
and Zeckhauser found that the larger members of the NA TO alliance bore a 
disproportionate share of the cost of the common defense. The large had 
less to gain from driving a hard bargain and more to Jose from withdrawal.• 
Other researchers have extended this analysis, finding that different 
types of NA TO defense expenditures are more or less collective in nature 
and accordingly more or less susceptible to the free-riding of the small. For 
example, the airports, roads, and other infrastructure costs of the alliance 
provide many distinctly national benefits. It is therefore not surprising that 
the small members of NA TO fully shoulder their fair share of these 
burdens. 5 
The Political Economics of Fighting Alliances 
Despite the various applications of collective goods theory to alliance 
behavior, none have applied the paradigm to the actual fighting conducted 
when alliances are employed in wartime. This is largely because victory in 
war, unlike national defense in peacetime, is a good so highly valued that 
any increase in national income will be devoted to its provision. 6 Within 
very loosely joined or even essentiaily hostile alliances systems, very dif-
ferent processes may be at work. Within these alliances, the exhaustion of 
allies may be a good valued nearly so highly as the eventual defeat of the 
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collective foe. Free-riding might occur, for some members will make 
calculated effort to allocate a disproportionate share of the costs of the con-
flict to their allies. For example, revisionist historians have suggested that 
the Anglo-American refusal to set up a second front against the Nazis until 
late in World War II reflects a deliberate effort to bleed the Red Army white 
in its struggle against the Germans and thereby facilitate the Anglo-
American domination of postwar Europe .' 
Our previous theoretical work suggests that such tendencies may be 
pronounced within guerrilla alliances or other alliances composed of 
nonstate actors. Nonstate allies are particularly unlikely to be well united in 
the pursuit of victory. If they are essentially revolutionary rather than na-
tionalist movements, they will lack an acceptable prewar status quo from 
which to gain precedents for the postwar distribution of stakes. All the 
rebels are after the total control of the same government, and in the past 
many fully successful revolutions have served as a prelude to a far bloodier 
struggle determining who holds final power. 1 It has been suggested that 
Lenin had this in mind when he held back his Bolshevics from participating 
in the March 1917 revolution against the Czar. He thereby conserved his 
forces while the Liberals lost troops in the revolution, leaving themselves 
ripe for defeat in the fall. 9 
In extreme cases, one coalition member could even betray another. For 
example, it has been suggested that during the Vietnamese revolution 
against France, the Communist Party gave the French secret police a list of 
Nationalist Party leaders, even though the Communists and Nationalists 
were loosely allied at the time. 10 
Terrorism and Guerrilla Conflict 
In our previous work we have suggested that, particularly within guer-
rilla alliances, collective warmaking can be seen as a collective good subject 
to the free-riding common to such goods. The same may not be quite so true 
of terrorist alliances. 
Terrorism is often th9ught of as guerrilla war; indeed, the two terms 
are often employed interchangeably. In contemporary debate it is typically 
assumed that both are modern conflicts waged by revolutionary forces us-
ing hit and run tactics to wear down and eventually def eat the superior 
forces of the reactionary state. In fact, both guerrilla war and terrorism date 
back to ancient times. The Chinese empire faced essentially guerrilla war in 
defeating peasant revolts as early as the Fourth Century B.C .. The Jewish 
Maccabees fought a successful guerrilla war against the Syrians in the Sec-
ond Century B.C., and the Roman Empire defeated guerrilla movements 
undertaken at various times by the Jews, North Africans, and 
Celtiberians. 11 Similarly, Rapoport notes that the Zealots-Sicarii employed 
terrorism against the Romans and moderate Jewish leaders in the First Cen-
tury A.O., and the Thugs have used terror against individuals for thousands 
of years. 11 Moreover, no ideology holds a monopoly on either strategy. · 
Skilled guerrillas now fight Marxist regimes in Angola and Afghanistan, 
and one of the most successful (though losing) guerrilla struggles of all time 
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was fought against the French Revolutionary government by the rightist 
peasants and nobles of the Vendee region. The Black Hundreds, Nazis, 
KKK, and other reactionary groups have with varying success employed ter-
rorism or spawned terrorist movements. 
What then, are these phenomena? Guerrilla warfare denotes tactics 
employed by forces which cannot profitably meet the enemy in a conven-
tional battle because they are outgunned. The Guerrillas therefore employ 
relatively small scale assaults on weak enemy positions, fequently disburs-
ing after an attack. Their very weakness dictates a larely nocturnal strategy 
most active in remote regions where forests or rough terrain hinder the 
dominate army in its search and destroy missions. Successful guerrilla 
forces develop "liberated zones" under their authority. These regions serve 
symbolic purposes, provide training grounds, supply food and other 
materials, and give fighters a refuge. Victorious guerrilla forces (and few 
are victorious) must eventually form units large enough to fight conven-
tional battles. Guerrillas can never defeat a determined enemy without 
reaching this stage. 11 
Terrorism denotes the killings, bombings, robberies, kidnappings, hi-
jackings, and other destructive acts committed by small groups or in-
dividuals aimed at overthrowing or influencing the regime. 14 (Notably, 
some of these activities, particularly robberies, can also help keep the ter-
rorists in business.) Terrorism may be employed against specific targets 
linked to the offending regime or movement. Just as typically it is employed 
at random, to undermine regime authority by making it clear that the 
government cannot protect its citizens. ' ' 
Terrorism may act as adjunct to a guerrilla movement. For example, 
the Viet Cong quietly assassinated thousands of South Vietnamese village 
leaders in the 1950's and 1960's to remove the indigenous nonCommunist 
leadership. 16 Terrorism cannot on its own win power however, for by 
definition terrorism employs forces far too small to directly combat the 
state. Notwithstanding current speculation about nuclear terorism and the 
optimistic Narodnaya Volya belief that government would fall if a few 
leaders were eliminated, terrorism has never toppled a regime by itself. The 
most it has managed has been to help make liberal democracies less liberally 
democratic or (usually unintentionally) helped authoritarians overthrow 
such relatively benign regimes. The highly active leftist Uruguayan and 
Argentine terrorists of the l 970's, for example, only succeeded in provoking 
rightist military coups against the rather democratic governments of their 
nations. The new military regimes then fought ruthless (and successful) 
"dirty wars" against the terrorist movements. 11 
The Rational Terrorist 
Terrorist acts may be motivated by material or purposive incentives. 
(Terrorist groups are often held together by social ties, yet these incentives 
do not in and of themselves require terrorist acts for fulfillment.) As La-
queur details, many modern day terrorists are sponsored by governments. 
Libya, Iraq, Iran, South Yeman and various other states have subsidized 
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terrorists or even paid for them to handle specific jobs. The infamous 
"Carlos" and certain other terrorists and terrorist trainers are distinguished 
by their Swiss bank accounts and other benefits provided by governments 
who make use of their skills in furthering national foreign policy goals and 
enhancing international prestige. Such a nominal world power as Libya, for 
example, has gained considerable influence by sponsoring various 
movements. 11 While normally motivated at least partly by ideological con-
cerns, it cab be suggested that these terrorists are as much mercenaries as 
freedom fighters. 
International terrorists employed or supported by governments can 
find refuge within those nations. Even if apprehended, they may well serve 
only a few years provided that they ply their trade within relatively liberal 
states. 1' Terrorism can therefore offer good employment for the utility 
minded soldier. 
These relatively utilitarian terrorists may work together with other 
groups at times. Yet profiteering fighters are apt to lack a meaningful long 
term program separate from that of their sponsors . Arrangements between 
these terrorist groups will therefore be set up to tackle a single act in a con-
tractual manner rather than to independently conduct an allied campaign 
against the same enemy state. The respective inputs of personnel for each 
act are thus known. Ironically, free-riding among such groups is therefore 
not possible, at least partly because of the rationality of the terrorists and 
calculability of inputs, outputs, and inducements. 
More typical terrorists are motivated by essentially purposive aims. 
This is particularly true of those operating within a single authoritarian or 
totalitarian state. Such terrorism holds great risks and no material rewards 
save the occasional take from a bank heist or kidnapping. Even then, 
repressive governments are apt to treat anti-state robbers far more harshly 
than common criminals, making politically justified crime a far riskier pro-
fession. Of course, this is not always the case in more liberal states. Indeed, 
in these nations apprehended terrorists may be treated more humanely than 
ordinary criminals since it is assumed that they acted for reasons more noble 
than personal gain. In addition, since liberal states see nonviolent pressures 
as legitimate, they may also view violent political activity in a more re-
strained fashion than nonliberal states and may even give in to certain 
pressures in hope of buying them off in the same manner that nonviolent 
pressure group s can be pleased. For some purposively motivated terrorists, 
terror is an end in itself. Indian Thugs, for example, killed as a religious 
sacrifice to Kali, who derived satisfaction from the suffering of the victim 
and dedication of the murderer. 20 More recently, Fanon has suggested that 
the mere act of violence against an "oppressor" is emotionally liberating. 21 
In addition, it must be suggested that at least some terrorists derive pleasure 
from the adventure of their activity. For participants with these primary 
motivation s, no coalition partners are necessary. If coalitions do occur, no 
partner will seek to avoid activity, for participation itself is the goal, 
whatever its cost. Similarly, these groups are unlikely to be appeased by in-
ducement offers from their targets, for their aims are by nature intangible. 
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Terrorism is more typically employed as a means to the end of altering 
government policy (as in anti-abortion bombings or bombings protesting 
American involvement in Vietnam) or eventually taking power by destroy-
ing the government leaders or mass confidence in them. This basic proposi-
tion has important implications for the political economy of terrorism. 
First, those protesting particular policies can often be appeased by conces-
sions, particularly if the sacred policies are singular in nature and not linked 
to a broad ideology. Further, even in relatively liberal states where terrorists 
are not likely to meet death or torture, those so determined as to employ ter-
rorism are either abherent personalities, or, more often, motivated by deep-
ly help ideals which tolerate little deviation. Either way, it is not surprising 
that broad terrorist "movements" (e.g., the PLO, the IRA, the 
Weathermen and Yippies, etc.) are typically well splintered alliances of nar-
row factional groups. This has implications for coalitional behavior within 
such alliances, for free-riding or even betrayal to the state authorities can be 
expected. 
In radical perspectives, free-riders are moderates who choose less risky 
(and less violent) means of carrying out the struggle against the regime. For 
example, in the Introduction to his Terrorism and Communism Trotsky 
condemns the followers of Kautsky, who refrains from and advises against 
violent revolutionary action. Though not always in support of terrorism, 
Lenin similarly attacks the Mensheviks for their moderation in the 
struggle. 22 Similar denunciations of moderates have been made by rightist 
and nationalist terrorists. In the eyes of radicals, violent action is necessary 
for meaningful change. Those individuals and groups which do not assist in 
terrorism and revolt are simply free-riding off the efforts of others by 
avoiding the risky contributions to social transformation while being 
perfectly ready to benefit from it if it comes to pass. 13 
Betrayal is of a somewhat different character. It can be suggested that 
the aforementioned hostility extremist groups hold for their natural allies 
encourages betrayal to the authorities. For example, factions within the 
broad Armenian ASALA terrorist organization regularly betray other fac-
tions to Western authorities and even engage in acts of terror against 
them. 24 The Vietnamese case mentioned above can also be cited, and it is 
hardly surprising that terrorist groups confide little in their allies even where 
police penetration is not feared. In other instances moderate supporters of 
the cause may betray terrorists to reach accommodation with the regime or 
because they themselves fear the extremists. In a somewhat different vein, it 
can be suggested that terrorists may wish the destruction of other an-
tigovernment groups since those groups compete for followers during the 
struggle and could well compete for power should the antigovernment ac-
tivity ever succeed. 25 Given these incentives for betrayal, it is not surprising 
that a determined and united secret police or military can generally learn a 
great deal about a terrorist group and destroy it. As Laqueur's work notes 
time and time again, terrorists operating within a single regime, particularly 
an oppressive one, usually have short life spans whatever their level of 
popular support or ideological merit. This seems less true of ethnic groups 
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than of fundamentally ideologicai ones, perhaps because ideological 
motivations are inherently more subject to disagreement (and correspond-
ing problems of collective action) and less apt to gain widespread support. 
It can be suggested that Marxist theory, at least, takes some notice of 
these factors . Communist political and military organizations attempt to 
gain dominance over their leftist (and other) allies and integrate them into a 
''united front'' before fully pressing the battle against the government. 26 As 
Marx's reflections about the Paris Commune make clear, he distrusted 
allies and was keenly aware of the difficulties of coordinating a proletariat 
represented by more than one organization. 2' Lenin's views on the subject 
have already been noted, and the united front strategy could be interpreted 
as a means to eliminate rational free-riding or betrayal on the part of allies. 
Conclusion 
Political Economic approaches hold considerable power in explaining 
the micro level organization of interests. In addition, these analyses have 
been usefully employed to describe the behavior of international military 
alliances operating in peacetime. Political economic thinking has not been 
used to analyze fighting alliances, but we maintain that under certain cir-
cumstances nations and organizations will free-ride off their allies in collec-
tive warmaking. This is particularly tru·e of the nonstate alliances employing 
terrorism or fighting guerrilla wars. 
From our standpoint, terrorism differs most from guerrilla war in its 
smaller probability of winning power. It is not surprising that many 
terrorists---some of them essentially mercenaries---are not clearly after tak-
ing over government. This is important since the incentives which drive ter-
rorists have implications for combatting them. For example, if nations band 
together to liquidate mercenary terrorists even within their sponsor states, 
this activity will no longer offer adequate economic rewards and will prob-
ably diminish. Of course, such anti -terrorist activity can itself be considered 
a collective good subject to considerable free-riding on the part of nations. 
Moreover, such activity is unlikely to succeed so long as a large number of 
states tacitly approve of (even if they do not support) terrorists with foreign 
policy goals congruent to their own. 
Other terrorists are motivated by the thrill of action or the joy of 
violence against an "oppressor." Again, more aggressive pursuit of ter-
rorists could have some deterrent effect. Yet the nature of these motivations 
suggests that these forms of terrorism will be difficult to stop since the act 
of terror is an end in itself rather than a means to make money or alter 
policy. 
Perhaps most typically, terrorists use their acts as a means to an 
ideological end. In these cases, moderates can often be coopted or con-
vinced to leave the struggle and betray radicals to the regime (or at least 
"free-ride" off their violent cohorts) if certain concessions are granted 
them even as the state acts aggressively against the terrorists. Even when 
there are no moderates, the splintered nature of militant ideological 
organizations suggests that factions will often betray their allies, or at least 
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not greatly assist other groups under attack. The regime should, and usually 
does, foster the various divisions among these groups. Unfortunately (or 
maybe not), nationalist movements are far less likely to suffer the divisions 
of ideological organizations. This, combined with their mass base, makes 
them more difficult to repress. 
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